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Credibly Committing to Efficiency Wages:
Cotton Spinning Cartels in Imperial Japan
J. Mark Ramseyert
In most antitrust accounts, cartels are as inscrutable as they
are wrong. They are wrong because they are inefficient-they set
prices above marginal costs and generate suboptimal consump-
tion and production patterns.' They are inscrutable because as
prisoners' dilemmas they should never work-rational firms thus
should not spend resources forming and enforcing them.2
In this article, I use data from Japan to explore both issues.
The data concern production-limitation agreements among the
' Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I received generous financial support from
the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and the John M. Olin Foundation, and helpful
comments and suggestions from Douglas Baird, Gail Lee Bernstein, Taimie Bryant,
Richard Epstein, Eric Feldman, Harry First, David Galenson, Michael Huberman, Wil-
liam Klein, Geoffrey Miller, Yoshiro iwa, Clark Nardinelli, Tetsuji Okazaki, Randal
Picker, Richard Posner, Frances Rosenbluth, Arthur Rosett, Richard Sander, Paul Sheard,
Richard Smethurst, Haruhito Takeda, David Weinstein, Stephen Yeazell, and participants
in a workshop at the University of Tokyo Department of Economics.
1 To date, the most creative attempt to explain cartels as efficient is Lester G.
Telser, Cooperation, Competition, and Efficiency, 28 J L & Econ 271, 290 (1985) (applying
model originally discussed in Lester G. Telser, Economic Theory and the Core 106 (Chi-
cago, 1978)). See also George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A
New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J L & Econ 201 (1982) (applying Telser's model);
Stephen Craig Pirrong, An Application of Core Theory to the Analysid of Ocean Shipping
Markets, 35 J L & Econ 89 (1992) (same); Andrew R. Dick, The Competitive Consequences
of Japan's Export Cartel Associations, 6 J Jap & Intl Econ 275 (1992) (finding that export
cartels lower costs); Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium
Analysis, 80 Am Econ Rev 107 (1990) (finding that horizontal mergers are efficiency
enhancing). The best critique of Telser's model appears in John Shepard Wiley Jr., Anti-
trust and Core Theory, 54 U Chi L Rev 556 (1987). Telser's model does not apply to the
spinning cartel described below for the same reason that the monopoly-rent-extracting
model does not apply: the cotton spinning Japanese firms did not restrict capital invest-
ments and therefore did not effectively limit production. Telser's model applies only if
cartel members do limit production. The Japanese cotton spinning cartel did not even
try.
2 In other words, cartels are bad because firms form them to earn monopoly rents,
and toward that end hike prices. Once other members of a cartel have raised their prices,
however, the remaining members gain by underselling the others and stealing customers.
Since everyone has that incentive, cartels should be as unworkable as they are nefarious.
The classic account is George Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J Pol Econ 44 (1964).
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giant cotton spinning firms. Although these firms structured
their agreements much like a classic cartel, I show that they did
not (and did not try to) set prices at monopoly levels. Instead,
they used the agreements to tie their hands and commit credibly
to paying their workers "efficiency wages"--wages that were two
or three times market clearing wages. More generally, therefore,
I show that firms may agree to cut production for reasons that
have nothing to do with earning monopoly rents, and in the
process may form organizations that lack the prisoners' dilemma
that dooms classic cartels. If true, agreements that we call cartels
may sometimes be both socially efficient and individually ratio-
nal.
Consider this logic in more detail. First, the Japanese cotton
spinning firms paid their workers generously. By tradition,
Japan specialists accuse the cotton spinning firms of much the
same sins of which observers accused the Lancashire mills: that
they exploited their workers by paying them a pittance and
exploited consumers by fixing prices. The claims probably were
not true of Lancashire. Neither were they true of Japan. The
Japanese mills paid their workers double or triple the wage they
could earn elsewhere and charged consumers market-clearing
prices.
Second, as in the large Lancashire mills, these high wages
constituted what economists call "efficiency wages"-supra-mar-
ket wages that boosted productivity by at least the amount of the
wage premium itself. Mill owners apparently paid these high
wages because of the unfamiliar technology they used. At the
turn of the century, they used foreign machines in a foreign
factory system. They knew neither how much to expect from
their workers, nor, given the team character to the production
involved, how best to monitor those workers. Rather than hire
many managers to supervise their workers closely, they tried to
induce their employees to work hard with little monitoring. They
did so by raising the penalty workers incurred if they lost their
job, and they raised that penalty by paying double or triple the
market-clearing wage.
Third, efficiency wages potentially compounded the agency
slack between the mill owners and their managers. Although the
managers left some control over major decisions (like large
capital investments) with the owners, they themselves supervised
the daily operations of the firm. Necessarily, however, they could
give the owners only noisy information about the details of
factory operations and only incomplete information about the
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industry's demand curve. In turn, these informational problems
created an environment where a manager sometimes jeopardized
his tenure if he reduced his plant's production. As a result, short-
term managers had an incentive to operate the plant at full
capacity even when the reduced demand would have led the
owners themselves to idle some machines.
This situation sometimes gave managers an incentive to
respond to sudden drops in demand by cutting wages. Because
the firm intentionally paid workers a steady premium over the
workers' shadow wage, it needed managers who would respond to
these demand shocks primarily by cutting production. If manag-
ers instead merely cut wages, workers would eventually shirk
more, efficiency would eventually fall, and fhe firm's profits
would eventually fall as well.
Finally, managers and investors solved this principle-agent
problem through a cartel. In joining the cartel, the managers
delegated decisions about production cuts to the cartel's offi-
cers-independent personnel outside the firm. In the process,
they tied their own hands and credibly committed themselves to
responding to demand shocks by cutting production. In the
process, they also removed their own incentive to respond to
demand shocks by cheating on the firm's efficiency wage premi-
um. In effect, they thereby protected their firm's efficiency wage
regime from themselves.
In the next section, I summarize the history of cotton spin-
ning in Japan. In Section II, I outline why the cartel that the
spinning firms established could not have earned them monopoly
rents. I conclude, in Section IH, by using their efficiency wage
labor contracts to explain why they formed the cartel they did.
I. THE INDUSTRY
A. Cotton History
Cotton had already been in Japan a millennium when entre-
preneurs began to import modern spinning machines in the mid-
19th Century.3 Not that it matters. Japanese farmers never did
raise much raw cotton. In the middle of the 19th Century they
grew 49 million pounds, and by 1887 they increased that amount
to 67 million. They never grew more. They had no comparative
' Some of this introductory material will appear in Frances McCall Rosenbluth and
J. Mark Ramseyer, The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan
(forthcoming, 1995) (on file in the U Chi L Sch Roundtable office).
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advantage in cotton production, and by 1887 spinners were al-
ready importing 10 million pounds. By the end of the century the
spinners imported almost their entire supply, and the farmers
had switched to other crops.4
Even if Japanese farmers could not grow raw cotton competi-
tively, in the first decades of this century Japanese spinners and
weavers came to dominate their sectors of the industry. Half a
century earlier, English firms had been supreme. For decades,
the Crown had punished anyone who exported textile machines;
by some rumors, it had even hanged them.5 Perhaps because
such threats sometimes worked or perhaps for more mundane
reasons, mid-19th century English firms still had some of the
best machines and still dominated the field.
Things changed. At the turn of the century, Japanese firms
adopted this British technology. By the 1920s and 30s, they con-
sumed more raw cotton than their British competitors and spun
more yarn. Domestically, they created enormous wealth. By 1930,
textile firms produced over a quarter of all Japanese manufac-
tured goods and employed over 40 percent of all factory work-
ers .
6
B. Cotton Crises
During the half-century before World War II, firms in the
Japanese cotton textile industry weathered three major crises:
one at the turn of the century, one in the early 1920s, and one in
the mid-1930s. Toward the end of the 1890s, Japanese economic
performance dipped badly. Where from 1886 to 1898 manufactur-
ing volume had doubled, during the four years from 1898 to 1902
it fell. When the Boxer Rebellion broke out and Japanese firms
could no longer sell to China, bad matters simply turned worse.
In the textile industry, output fell 11 percent from 1898 to 1900
' Takeshi Abe, Men kogyo [The Cotton Industry], in Takeshi Abe and Shunsaku
Nishikawa, eds, Sangyoka no jidai [The Age of Industrialization] 163, 170 (Iwanami
shoten, 1990); Keizo Seki, Nihon mengyo ron [A Theory of the Japanese Cotton Industry]
13, 164, 436 (Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1954) ("Japanese Cotton Industry Theory")
(unless otherwise noted, all sources were translated by the author).
' E.J. Donnell, History of Cotton 12-13 (James Sutton & Co, 1872); Seki, Japanese
Cotton Industry Theory at 20 (cited in note 4).
6 Sanji Muto, Bosekigyo [The Spinning Industry], in Shakai keizai taikei [Overview of
Social Economics] 5 (no pub infor; cat'd in the U of Tokyo Dept Econ lib at 12/120P, 1927)
(cotton consumption in 1927); Seki, Japanese Cotton Industry Theory at 60 (yarn produc-
tion in 1935) and id at 435 (of all manufacturing workers, 42.5 percent were in one of the
textile industries in 1934-36) (cited in note 4).
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and another eight percent from 1900 to 1904.'
A second crisis hit the cotton spinning firms in 1920. As it
had been to many firms in many countries, World War I was
good to Japanese spinners. During the War, many Allied compet-
itors joined the war effort and even those who did not found the
sea lanes precarious and the Suez Canal closed. In East Asia, all
of this dramatically raised cotton prices. From 1916 to 1919, the
price of raw cotton rose 2.7 times, and that of cotton yarn 4.5
times. Given that raw cotton costs were four-fifths of the price of
cotton yarn, this price differential gave entrepreneurial spinners
a nice profit.'
Japanese spinners found themselves well placed to exploit
these high international prices-but badly placed for the bust
that followed. From 1915 to 1919, they watched real profits per
spindle more than double. When the war ended and prices fell,
they watched these profits plummet. Granted, they did not do as
badly as observers claimed. Cotton yarn prices did fall, but so did
raw cotton prices. Nonetheless, as with firms elsewhere that had
tried to ride the war-time boom, the spectacular wartime profits
disappeared.' From 1920 to 1926, real profits per spindle fell by
two-thirds (Table 1).
The problems arose from two facts. First, not all firms had
hedged themselves against price changes. Those that had agreed
to buy raw cotton at'the earlier high prices without agreeing to
sell at fixed prices now lost badly. Second, even firms that had
hedged sometimes found the protection worthless because their
buyers could renege. Although those that had contracted to sell
high should have done well, they did well only if their buyers did
not default. Many buyers did. Where the price changes had elimi-
nated the buyer's assets, even courts could not help.'0
A third crisis hit the industry some ten years later. After the
7 Shozaburo Fujino, Shino Fujino and Akira Ono, Choki keizai tokei: Sen'i kogyo
[Long-Term Economic Statistics: The Textile Industry] 244-45 (Toyo keizai shimpo sha,
1979) ("Long-term Textile Statistics"); Seisan chosa kai, ed, Shuyo kogyo gairan [Survey of
Major Industries] 1 (Seisan chosa kai, 1912).
8 Kusuhei Mihashi, ed, Toyo boseki kabushiki gaisha yoran [A Survey of the Toyo
Spinning Corporation] 37-38 (Toyo boseki K.K., 1934) ("Toyo Spinning Corporation") (price
changes); Nippon kangyo ginko chosaka, ed, Menshi boseki gyo ni kansuru chosa [An
Investigation into the Cotton Threat Spinning Industry] 43-49 (Nihon kangyo ginko
chosaka, 1928) ("Cotton Threat") (raw cotton cost fraction as of the late 1920s).
' William Lazonick and William Mass, The Performance of the British Cotton Indus-
try, 1870-1913, 9 Res Econ Hist 1, 2 (1984); Mihashi, Toyo Spinning Corporation at 37-38
(cited in note 8) (price data).
10 Seki, Japanese Cotton Industry Theory at 43-46 (cited in note 4).
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general financial collapse of 1929-31, many governments began to
adopt protectionist policies. Some of these policies were designed
explicitly against Japanese products. Japanese firms, for exam-
ple, particularly threatened British competitors. From 1928 to
1935, Japanese cotton fabric exports rose from 1.4 to 2.7 billion
square yards, while British exports fell from 3.9 to 1.9 billion
square yards. To slow this competitive shift, Commonwealth
countries adopted stringent tariffs, and many added quantity
restraints to boot. By mid-1936, Japanese cotton weavers faced
trade barriers in a majority of their markets: 56 countries had
adopted barriers and over half were quotas. By one estimate, the
barriers affected 67 percent of Japanese cotton fabric exports. 2
Table 1: PROFITABILITY IN THE COTrON SPINNING INDUSTRY
Profits/ Profits/ Profits/
Firm (¥1000) Spindle Y1000 Capital
1907 629 17.14 354.3
1908 307 6.17 136.7
1909 515 8.18 181.8
1910 203 3.49 79.7
1911 368 5.77 139.6
1912 547 10.29 232.9
1913 646 11.77 243.7
1914 545 8.61 193.9
1915 741 10.81 249.2
1916 1431 19.91 415.4
1917 2201 30.93 543.2
1918 2225 27.43 443.7
1919 1730 26.78 330.1
1920 1756 25.78 228.5
1921 1154 16.92 150.2
1922 1213 17.18 152.5
1923 780 11.15 88.8
1924 956 10.99 97.2
1925 895 9.31 85.1
1926 862 8.44 78.5
Notes: Total capital is the sum of paid-in capital and accumulated profits.
Profits are in constant 1934-36 yen.
Sources: Calculated from data found in Ryokichi Watanabe, Nihon mengyo
ron [The Theory of the Japanese Cotton Industry] 340-41 (Nippon hyoron sha, 1931);
Kazushi Ohkawa et al, Choki keizai tokei: Bukka [Long-Term Economic Statistics:
Prices] 135-36 (Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1967).
" Hiroshi Nishikawa, Nippon teikoku shugi to mengyo [Japanese Imperialism and the
Cotton Industry] 190 (Minerubwa shobo, 1987) ("Japanese Imperialism and Cotton"); Seki,
Japanese Cotton Industry Theory at 436-41 (cited in note 4). For the debate over the cause
of the British decline in cotton spinning, see Lazonick and Mass, 9 Res Econ Hist at 1
(cited in note 9).
12 Fujino, Fujino and Ono, Long-term Textile Statistics at 244-45 (cited in note 7);
Nishikawa, Japanese Imperialism and Cotton at 192 (cited in note 11); R. Robson, The
Cotton Industry in Britain 268 (Macmillan, 1957); Seki, Japanese Cotton Industry Theory
at 55 (cited in note 4).
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II. THE COTTON CARTEL
A. Organization
These crises were not lean years the cotton spinning firms
stoically endured for the sake of the years of plenty to come.
Instead, the firms sought safety in numbers. Already in 1882,
they had organized themselves into the "Great Japan Spinning
Federation" (Dai-Nippon Boseki Rengo Kai, abbreviated "Boren").
By all accounts, the cotton spinning firms were the first in the
textile industry to cartelize. By many accounts, they were among
the first in any modern Japanese industry to cartelize.'3 To
them, the Boren now became the focus for their efforts to respond
to these crises.
The conventional story is simple enough. Initially, the spin-
ning firms used the Boren to gain monopsonistic power in the
labor market: to lower wages by not bidding for each others'
workers.'4 Soon, they used it to gain monopolistic power in the
product market: to raise profits by enforcing quantity restraints.
By 1890 they were coordinating reduced operating hours, days,
and machines (Table 2). Workers earned less and consumers paid
more, so the story goes, but with no antitrust statute it was all
legal.
Superficially, it was also plausible business strategy. If there
had been large scale economies, perhaps new firms would have
found it hard to enter the industry without access to substantial
capital. 5 If capital markets were under-developed, perhaps new
firms could not have obtained that access except from one of the
large conglomerates (the zaibatsu)."6 Given the size of the globe,
they arguably could not have entered the industry quickly even
with the best financial connections. Japanese firms did not make
competitive spinning machines, after all, until the late 1920s."
Toshiyuld Shinomiya, Karuteru to sono tokucho [Cartels and Their Characteristics],
in Keiichiro Nakagawa, Hidemasa Morikawa and Tsunehiko Yui, eds, Kindai Nihon keiei
shi no kiso chishiki [Basic Information Regarding Early Modern Japanese Management
History] 193-94 (Yuhikaku, 1990) ("Japanese Management History").
" Takahiko Hashimoto, Nippon menshiseki gyo shi nempo [A Time Line for the
Japanese Cotton Yarn Spinning Industry] 26 (Bunka shi nempyo seisaku kenkyu kai,
1935).
In fact, there were some scale economies. See Table 9.
16 In fact, capital markets were well-developed. See Rosenbluth and Ramseyer,
Politics of Oligarchy (cited in note 3).
17 Toshiaki Chokki, Boshoku gyo to koo shita boshokki no hatten [The Development of
Spinning and Weaving Machines in Response to the Spinning and Weaving Industry], in
Nakagawa, Morikawa; Yui, Japanese Management History at 258 (cited in note 13).
153]
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Before then, a firm intent on undercutting the cartel would have
had to import its equipment from Great Britain or the U.S.
During the five decades before the War, the spinning firms
coordinated capacity cuts eleven times (Table 2). They launched
the first in 1890, but disbanded it within a month. They
launched the last in 1930, and continued it eight years. 8 All
told, they maintained capacity restraints for twenty years. Ac-
cording to Table 3, moreover, production per unit of capital
equipment did decline. On average, they mandated production
cuts of about 20 percent. On average, production per spindle fell
about 10 percent.
Table 2: QuANITY REsTRAnTs IN THE CorroN SPINNING INDUSTRY, 1890-1930
Beginning
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Date Duration Restraints
1890 Jun 1 Mo. No work for 8 days & nights per mo.
1899 Jan 1 Mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo.
1900 May 2 mo. Same
1900 Jul 3 mo. Either no night work or a 40%
reduction in machines used
1900 Oct 3 mo. Same
1901 Jan 3 mo. Same
1902 Jul 6 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo.
1908 Jan 4 mo. No work for 5 days & nights per mo.
1908 May 6 mo. Either no night work for 3 months or
a 27.5% reduction in machines used
for 6 months
1908 Nov 18 mo. 20% reduction in machines used
1910 Oct 6 mo. Either (i) a 27.5% reduction in
machines used or (ii) no night work
for 4 days & nights per mo. plus 2
hour reduction per day plus a 12.5%
reduction in machines used
1911 Apr 6 mo. Same
1911 Oct 6 mo. Either (i) a 10% reduction in
machines used or (ii) no work for 5
days & nights per mo.
1912 Apr 6 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo.
1914 Aug 4 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo.
and a 10% reduction in machines used
1914 Dec 8 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo.
and a 20% reduction in machines used
1915 Aug 6 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo.
and a 10% reduction in machines used
1918 Jan 6 mo. A 10% reduction either in the
machines used or in the days worked
1" Seki, Japanese Cotton Industry Theory at 110 (cited in note 4).
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Table 2 (cont'd):
1918 Jul 6 mo. Same
9. 1920 May 1 mo. No work for 6 days & nights per mo.
1920 Jun 2 ma. No work for 4 days & nights per mo.,
a 10% reduction in the machines
used, and a reduction of 4 bra/day
1920 Aug 13 ma. Same, but with a 20% machine cut
1921 Sept 3 mo. Same, but 10% machine cut
10. 1927 May 6 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo.,
a 15% reduction in machines used,
and a reduction of 4 hrs/day
1927 Nov 20 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo.,
a 23% reduction in machines used,
and a reduction of 4 hra/day
11. 1930 Feb 5 mo. No work for 2 days & nights per mo.,
and a 10% reduction in machines used
1930 Jun 5 ma. No work for 2 days & nights per ma.,
and a 20% reduction in machines used
1930 Nov 2 mo. Same
Sources: Otokichi Shoji, Boseki sogyo tanshuku shi [A History of the Spinning Operation
Reductions] (Nip pon mengyo kurabu, 1930); Seisan chosa kai, ed, Shuyo kogyo gairan [Survey of
Major IndustriesJ](Seisan chosa kai, 1912); Shotaro Kojima, Waga kuni shuyo sangyo ni okeru
karuteru teki tosei [Cartel-Controls in the Major Industries in Our Country] 407-18 (Yufukan
shobo, 1932).
Table 3: QuAN'r RrmnAmTs AND SPnDLE PaoDucTrnvm
Mandated Bales/ Mandated Bales/
Reductions Spindle Reductions Spindle
1899 0 % 578 1916 1.9 % 684
1900 9.9 475 1917 0 654
1901 3.8 499 1918 0 578
1902 7.2 570 1919 0 576
1903 0 581 1920 31.5 492
1904 0 515 1921 47.0 454
1905 0 657 1922 0 508
1906 0 699 1923 0 465
1907 0 663 1924 0 453
1908 16.8 545 1925 0 485
1909 20.0 556 1926 0 490
1910 12.4 566 1927 28.9 453
1911 19.7 521 1928 47.2 401
1912 9.7 626 1929 23.6 440
1913 0 664 1930 21.8 374
1914 7.6 646 1931 25.3 358
1915 27.9 620
Mean bales/spindle, when restrictions in place: 506.
Mean bales/spindle, when no restrictions in place: 559.
Mean mandated reduction when restrictions in place: 21.2%.
Mean actual reduction: 9.5%.
Notes: Mandated reductions are calculated on the basis of 20 hour work days (two shifts),
28 work-day months, seven hour nights. 1916 is treated as an unrestricted year. Bales/spindle
gives the number of cotton bales produced, divided by the number of spindles in place.
Sources: Calculated from data found in Table 2; Keizo Seki, Nihon mengyo ron [A Theory of
the Japanese Cotton Industry) 446 (Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1954).
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B. Leaks
Nevertheless, as a long-term monopoly-pricing strategy this
cartel never had a chance. First, the Japanese cotton spinning
firms faced constant pressure from potential entrants. This sim-
ply was not an industry with large entry barriers. The most spec-
tacularly successful late entrant was Nisshin boseki. Cotton mer-
chant Hirazaemon Hibiya had launched the firm in 1907. By
1910 it was in the second quintile of firms; by 1930 it ranked
sixth in a field of over sixty. 9 Smaller firms, however, continued
to enter the industry throughout the pre-war period. Further-
more, the cartel never (1) incorporated all members (much less
all potential members) of the industry, or (2) limited investments
in new productive capacity. ° I consider each of these issues in
turn.
1. Incomplete membership.
The Boren never included all members of the industry. Most
obviously, it excluded foreign competitors, this at a time when
non-Japanese producers often joined cartels across national
boundaries.2' The Boren began as an organization of Japanese
spinning firms and forever remained that. Nonetheless, those
firms sold in what was always a global market. Despite varia-
tions in thread quality, many firms in many countries produced
interchangeable thread. Granted, foreign spinners could not nec-
essarily compete in the Japanese market. Tariffs on imported
cotton products helped ensure that. Notwithstanding, Japanese
firms competed abroad with many spinners from many coun-
tries-most prominently, firms in Great Britain, the U.S.,
France, Germany, and India.
Ultimately, spinners competed in this competitive interna-
tional market. Even when they sold to domestic weavers, those
weavers often exported the finished fabric.22 Given these inter-
19 Nisshin boseki, K.K., ed, Nisshin boseki 60 nen shi [A Sixty-Year History of Nisshin
boseki] (Nisshin boseki, MK., 1969); Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai, ed, Dai-Nippon boseki
rengo kai geppo [Great Japan Spinning Federation Monthly Newsletter] (Dai-Nippon
boseki rengo kai, various issues) (relative size of firms by number of spindles) ("Great
Japan Spinning").
' In addition, note that the cartel did not take several obvious steps open to it. The
firms could have tried to restrict output through their coordinated import scheme in-
volving the N.Y.I (see text accompanying notes 24-25), but did not. Indeed, they could
have set prices, but did not.
21 Terushi Hara and Akira Kudo, International Cartels in Business History, in Akira
Kudo and Terushi Hara, eds, International Cartels in Business History 1-2 (Tokyo, 1992).
Mihashi, Toyo Spinning Corporation at 7 (cited at note 8) (foreign competitors);
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national fabric markets, Japanese spinners generally could not
have charged monopoly yarn prices to domestic weavers: as long
as a downstream product faces a competitive market, upstream
cartels with fewer than all producers (for example, a spinning
cartel that excludes foreign competitors) will seldom be able to
raise prices. Indeed, because many of the largest Japanese spin-
ners (like the large American spinners) ran integrated spinning
and weaving operations, many Boren members sold fabric on the
international market directly (Table 4)Y
Until 1936, the Boren could not even convince all Japanese
spinners to join.' To be sure, it tried to make membership
worthwhile. It never made it indispensablee. In 1893 it negotiat-
ed a favorable shipping contract with the N.Y.K., the Mitsubishi
shipping firm.' Under this agreement, the N.Y.K. agreed to pay
large rebates to association members who used it for shipping
their raw cotton. More specifically, the N.Y.K. charged shippers
full price, but at the end of the accounting season rebated to
Boren members a large portion of that price. Unfortunately for
the Boren, the bulk shipping market remained a competitive
market. As one scholar recently put it, "collusion among shippers
has never survived" in this industry." The Japanese shipping
firms launched periodic price wars with the western firms, and
were not always the low bidders. Yet the Boren could have made
membership advantageous only (i) if the N.Y.K. charged prices
below international competitive prices, and (ii) if no other inter-
national shipping firm were willing to match those prices."
Okura sho zeikanbu, ed, Kanzeiritsu enkaku [A History of Tariff Rates] (Okura sho, 1968)
(tariffs).
' Although these integrated firms operated fewer than 20 percent of all looms, they
operated the most efficient ones. In 1936, they ran nearly three-fourths of the 46,000
automatic looms in use. With a fifth of the looms, they wove a third of the fabric. See
Table 4; Shoko daijin kanbo tokei ka, ed, Kojo tokei hyo [Census of Manufactures] 413
(Tokyo tokei kyoka, 1936) (automatic loom use). On integrated spinning and weaving
operations generally in the West, see John S. Lyons, Vertical Integration in the British
Cotton Industry, 1825-1850: A Revision, 45 J Econ Hist 419 (1985); Peter Temin, Product
Quality and Vertical Integration in the Early Cotton Textile Industry, 48 J Econ Hist 891
(1988) (discussing primarily American integrated spinning and weaving operations).
2 As of September 1927, for instance, 11 spinning companies representing six per-
cent of all cotton spindles were outside the Boren. Nippon kangyo, Cotton Threat at 55-58
(cited in note 8). These firms joined the Boren in May 1936. Zaisei keizai jiho sha, ed,
Nippon sen'i kogyo soran okutsuki [An Overview of the Japanese Textile Industry, with
Appendix] 210 (Zaisei keizai jiho sha, 1936) ("Japanese Textile Industry Overview").
Reprinted in Seisan chosa kai, ed, Shuyo kogyo gairan [Survey of Major Industries]
26-29 (Seisan chosa kai, 1912). Other shipping firms later joined the N.Y.K.
Pirrong, 35 J L & Econ at 128 (cited in note 1).
Shotaro Kojima, Waga kuni shuyo sangyo ni okeru karuteru teki tosei [Cartel-
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Renegade spinners simply did not need the N.Y.K. Although
the Boren firms could together obtain bulk discounts, so could
most other spinners. Major spinning firms would have qualified
for equivalent discounts elsewhere. Whatever clout the Boren
had, as the shipping arm of the Mitsubishi empire the N.Y.K.
was not the sort of firm on which it likely could have imposed
monopsonistic prices. Unless it was indeed extracting monopso-
nistic rents, though, renegade firms could have competed without
joining it.2"
2. Investment limits.
As Table 3 details, the Boren never tried to limit the total
number of spindles. Instead, it mandated cuts only in either
operating hours or the percentage of spindles used. This made for
a bizarre cartel, for to earn its members monopoly rents the
Boren had to cut the quantity produced. To do that, it could not
just cut hours or furlough existing spindles. It needed also to
limit the purchase of new spindles. That it never did. In letting
firms buy new spindles while not letting them use them fully, it
ensured only that its members invested inefficiently.
Even as the Boren mandated production cuts, spinning firms
Controls in the Major Industries in Our Country] 478-511 (Yufukan shobo, 1932) (shipping
cartels) ("Cartel Controls"); Nihon keiei shi kenkyu sho, ed, Nippon yusen kabushiki
kaisha 100-nen shi [A 100-Year History of the N.Y.K.] 7-74, 123-29 (Nippon yusen
kabushiki kaisha, 1988) (competition between N.Y.K. and the western firms); William D.
Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.YK, 1870-1914: Business Strategy in the Japanese Shipping
Industry 289-308, 400-08 (Harv Council E Asian Stud Pub, 1984) (same); William D.
Wray, Kagami Kenkichi and the N.Y.K, 1929-1935: Vertical Control, Horizontal Strategy,
and Company Autonomy, in William D. Wray, ed, Managing Industrial Enterprise: Cases
from Japan's Prewar Experience 182, 187 (Harvard, 1989) (existence of irregular "tramp
shipping").
Indeed, if the Boren had been a price-fixing scheme and if the N.Y.K. had had a lock
on cotton imports, one would expect the Boren to have enforced its quantity restraints
through its control over raw cotton imports. Given that the spinners depended critically
on cotton imports, that bottleneck offered the perfect monitoring device. The Boren did
not do so-both because it was not a price-fixing scheme (see text accompanying notes 19-
20), and because the N.Y.K. did not have a lock on the import trade.
In addition, note two points. First, the Boren convinced the domestic raw cotton
producers not to sell to non-Boren firms. Because domestic producers raised a small
fraction of the cotton consumed, this was not a major barrier. Second, in 1930 the Boren
convinced the cotton yarn sellers' association not to buy yarn from non-Boren firms. In
return, Boren members agreed to sell only to members of the sellers' association. See
Kojima, Cartel Controls at 413 (cited in note 27); Nippon kangyo, Cotton Threat at 54-55
(cited in note 8); Seki, Japanese Cotton Industry at 114-16 (cited in note 4). At this point,
the only firms safely able to remain outside the Boren would have been those that both
spun and wove. As Table 4 shows, however, the biggest Japanese firms operated integrat-
ed spinning and weaving factories.
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continued to buy new equipment (Table 5). Despite the capacity
restraints, they aggressively built new factories and installed
new spindles. Indeed, they built more factories and installed
more spindles while the restraints were in place than while they
were not. Had they wanted to affect prices, they would not have
agreed just to cut the stock used. They would also have agreed to
idle any new equipment they bought. That they never did. Were
this a production-restriction cartel, it was one that failed.
Table 4: SPINNING FIRMS IN THE WEAVING INDUSTRY
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Total Spinning Total Spinning EJFirm
Looms Looms B/A Fabric Fabric E/ Rev.
1905 6,077 715 154 21.5 % 11.9 %
1910 17,002 1222 332 27.2 18.5
1915 27,931 1824 710 38.9 27.3
1920 43,725 6936 2950 42.5 27.0
1925 365,369 61,918 16.9 7719 2732 35.4 22.5
1930 348,903 69,147 19.8 4933 1631 33.1 25.5
1935 385,980 83,308 21.6 8104 2466 30.4 21.7
Notes:
(A) Total number of cotton weaving looms in use.
(B) Total number of cotton weaving looms used by spinning firms.
(C) Percentage of cotton weaving looms used by spinning firms.
(D) Value in current prices (x Y100,000) of total cotton fabric produced.
(E) Value in current prices (x V100,000) of cotton fabric produced by spinning firms.
(F) Percentage of total cotton fabric produced by spinning firms.
(G) Percentage of spinning firm revenues attributable to weaving operations.
Sources: Calculated from data found in Shozaburo Fujino, Shino Fujino and Akira
Ono, Choki keizai tokei: Sen'i kogyo [Long-Term Economic Statistics: Textile Industry]
74-83, 242-43 (Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1979); Miyohei Shinohara, Choki keizai tokei:
kokogyo fLong-term Economic Statistics: Mining and Manufacturing] 194-95 (Toyo keizai
shimpo sha, 1972); Shoko daijin kanbo tokei ka, ed, Shoko sho tokei hyo [Statistical
Tables for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry] (Tokyo tokei kyokai, various years).
Table 5: SPINNING CARTEL CHEATING
A. B. C.
Mandated Spinning Spindles
Reductions Factories (x 1000)
1920 31.5 % (40) 355
1921 47.0 89 299
1922 0 (159) 394
1923 0 (1) 284
1924 0 20 (91)
1925 0 (8) 451
1926 0 37 293
1927 28.9 22) 263
1928 47.2 6 531
1929 23.6 38 233
1930 21.8 18 595
1931 25.3 15 221
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Table 5 (cont'd)
Mean new spindles while restrictions in place: 328,000.
Mean new spindles while no restrictions in place: 266,000.
Mean new spinning fact's while restrictions in place: 14.8.
Mean new spinning fact's while no restrictions in place: -22.2.
Notes:
(A) Cartel-mandated reductions.
(B) Net increase (or decrease) in number of spinning factories with five or more
employees.
(C) Net increase (or decrease) in number of operating spindles.
Sources: Calculated from data found in Table 2; Shoko daijin kanbo tokei ka, ed,
Kojo tokei hyo [Census of Manufactures] (Tokyo tokei kyokai, various years 1920-31);
Tsusho sangyo daijin kanbo chosa tokei kyoku, ed, Kogyo tokei 50 nenshi [A Fifty Year
History of the Manufactures Census] (Okura sho insatsu kyoku, 1961); Keizo Seki, Nihon
mengyo ron [A Theory of the Japanese Cotton Industry] 446 (Tokyo daigaku shuppan
kai, 1954).
C. Temporary Local Gains?
Even if the Boren firms could not have earned monopoly
rents over the long-term, perhaps they hoped to exploit a tempo-
rary local monopoly. 9 Expansion in the industry did take time.
29 Consider the additional hypotheses. First, many Japanese historians suggest that
the largest spinning firms used the restrictions to gain a competitive advantage over the
smaller firms. See for example, Nishikawa, Japanese Imperialism and Cotton at 154 (cited
in note 11); Naosuke Takamura, Nihon boseki gyo shi josetsu [An Introduction to the Histo-
ry of the Japanese Spinning Industry] 178-91 (Hanawa shobo, 1971) ("History of Japanese
Spinning Industry"). Recall, however, that membership in the cartel was voluntary, that
spinning firms imported raw cotton in a competitive international market, and that they
sold yarn and fabric on a competitive international market. The large spinning firms
could have induced the small firms to join the Boren (or to remain in the Boren) and
suffer the exploitative consequences only if the small firms earned a net gain by doing so.
Hence, the large firms would have had to compensate the smaller firms for any exploita-
tion the small firms suffered. Because of the competitive market constraints, however, the
large Boren firms had no way of using the Boren to generate sufficient monopoly rents to
pay that compensation and still earn a profit.
Second, Tetsuji Okazaki, 1930-nen dai no Nihon ni okeru keiki junkan [Japanese
Business Cycles and Capital Accumulation in the 1930s], 39 Shakai kagaku kenkyu 1
(1987), suggests an ingenious alternative: Small spinners were heavily invested in low-
count thread, and large spinners were invested in high-count thread. Small spinners
wanted to move into high-count thread, and used the cartel to give them breathing space
to do so. Aside from the questions of whether the cartel would have given any breathing
space without international market power and whether large firms would ever have
agreed to such a plan, Okazaki's theory does not explain why small firms would find
advantageous a scheme that disabled themselves as much as it disabled their competitors.
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Because most firms already operated 25 to 28 days a month, 20
to 22 hours a day, non-Boren firms could not have dramatically
expanded production without buying new machines. Yet until the
1920s, almogt all machines came from either Great Britain or the
United States. Even with a telegraphed order, expansion would
have taken quite a while. Meanwhile, perhaps the Boren firms
could have earned monopoly returns."
As an explanation for the Boren, this could not have
worked-short-term monopoly returns cannot explain the mea-
sures the Boren took, since it did not take short term measures.
Rather, it took measures that lasted for months and years. Nor
did the Boren ignore the measures once competition eroded any
monopoly price. Instead, month after month, Boren firms re-
grouped to change the percentage of spindles furloughed, the
number of days closed, or the number of hours per day worked.
To the firms themselves, the cuts meant more than any short-
term advantage. In any event, short term monopoly rents were
an advantage they never earned. According to Gary Saxonhouse,
the American economist who has most studied this industry,
Boren firms did not "restrict industry output, even on a cyclical
basis."3
1
III. COTTON LOGIC
The basic puzzle thus remains: if the Boren firms were not
trying to earn monopoly rents, what did they think they were
doing? The answer, I suggest, is that they were trying to solve
Third, participants at one presentation of this paper offered another intriguing
hypothesis: the Boren firms used capacity cuts to preserve their collective reputation for
treating workers fairly. Absent a cartel, some firms would have tried to hire workers into
their factory during times of peak demand, then fire them during slack demand. Unfortu-
nately, the cartel neither limited ixpansion during boom times nor limited contraction
during the busts.
' On the hours and days worked, see the tables at the end of any issue of Dai-
Nippon, Great Japan Spinning (cited in note 19). On.the source of spinning machines, see
Mariko Tatsuki, Mitsui Bussan no setsuritsu to hatten [The Establishment and Develop-
ment of Mitsui Bussan] ("Establishment and Development") in Nakagawa, Japanese Man-
agement History at 36, 40 (cited in note 13).
" Gary Saxonhouse, Country Girls and Communication Among Competitors in the
Japanese Cotton-Spinning Industry, in Hugh Patrick and Larry Meisner, eds, Japanese
Industrialization and its Social Consequences 97, 122 (University of California, 1976);
Gary Saxonhouse, Mechanisms for Technology Transfer in Japanese Economic History, 12
Managerial & Dec Econ 83, 84 (1991). Note that this is consistent with the 9.5% fall in
production during the cartel (Table 3). The cartels were in place during slack demand.
Even if they had been completely ineffective, production would have fallen somewhat
during their tenure-if only because consumers were less willing to buy the yarn.
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two principal-agent problems at once: to pay workers enough to
reduce their "shirking," and to enable their managers to commit
credibly to keeping wages at levels that would mitigate that
shirking. I turn first to the wages in the industry (Section
III.A. and B.), then to the managerial problems (Section III.C.).
A. Efficiency Wages
1. Monitoring and shirking.
Picture the problem that the owners of the new mills faced.
In a society where almost all manufacturing occurred in small
shops, they built massive factories. In a world where machines
ran on muscle or water, they introduced steam and later electrici-
ty. In the new factories, they installed large, complicated, and
expensive British-made machines.
To run these powerful new factories and machines, the own-
ers needed managers and workers they did not have. They need-
ed managers who could organize individual workers into teams
suited to factory production. They needed managers who could
structure incentives so that the workers individually would not
free-ride on each other. They needed managers who could teach
the workers how to run the new machines and to avoid breaking
them. As of 1891, however, they had only one formally trained
engineer for every six factories.3
The owners also needed workers who would work obediently,
regularly, and carefully. As the new ring spindles were relatively
easy to operate, they did not need workers who understood phys-
ics or chemistry, or workers with much physical strength. They
did need workers who would not ignore instructions, who would
not skip work on a whim, and who would not take breaks that
' Readers may also ask why the Boren (like many trade associations) did not try to
manipulate the political process to form a legally enforceable cartel. The reason, discussed
in Rosenbluth & Ramseyer, Politics of Oligarchy (cited in note 3), is that the zaibatsu
firms had the greatest political influence in pre-war Japan, and the zaibatsu firms had
interests contrary to the Boren. The zaibatsu were not heavily invested in cotton spinning
(Table 10). Yet the Mitsubishi, through the N.Y.K., shipped the bulk of the raw cotton to
the spinners, while the Mitsui marketed the finished product abroad. Any contraction in
the raw cotton consumed or the cotton yarn sold (even if international competitive market
forces would have allowed this) would thus have directly harmed the politically powerful
Mitsubishi and Mitsui.
' Saxonhouse, Country Girls and Communication at 109 (cited in note 31). See also
Noshomu sho somukyoku tokeika, ed, Noshomu tokei hyo [Agricultural and Commercial
Statistics] 63 (Noshomu sho somukyoku tokeika, 1903) (many factory supervisors did not
understand the machines under their jurisdiction).
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disrupted production at the entire plant. They needed, in short,
workers with what we now call "basic work habits." Before the
industrial revolution, few people considered such habits basic, for
few people needed them in either agrarian or handicraft produc-
ti6n. Eventually, school teachers did bring these habits to Japa-
nese peasant children. As of 1891, though, only a quarter of the
workers at the spinning plants had attended primary school.'
Somehow, the mill owners had to teach their workers to use
the new machines safely and effectively, to convince them to
work together as a team, and to induce them not to free-ride on
each other. Fundamentally, this was largely a matter of incen-
tives. Unfortunately, to use the optimal incentives the owners
had to be able to monitor workers individually and to dispense
appropriate penalties and rewards. Yet precisely because it in-
volves joint production, team work is hard to meter. Precisely
because cotton spinning involved team work, the owners found it
hard to meter their workers-and hard, therefore, to reward and
discipline them appropriately.
This is complicated enough where the technology is familiar;
it is harder still where everything about the factory is strange.35
With new machines, an owner often will have no idea how much
he (the owners and managers of these factories were generally
men) can expect of a recruit. Not knowing what to expect, he
cannot set the proper piece rate. Predictably, many of the earliest
Japanese factory owners produced- nothing so much as chaos.
Their workers did not know how to use the machines, their man-
agers did not know how to structure incentives to motivate work-
ers, and absent appropriate incentives the workers had little
reason to learn to use the machines.
Contemporary observers chronicled the chaos. "If a supervi-
sor can see the employees (particularly day laborers), they work
attentively," reported one otherwise sympathetic man in 1899.
"But as soon as he disappears, they gossip in groups of two or
three." 6 "The day after payday," another observer wrote, "em-
Saxonhouse, Country Girls and Communication at 109 (cited in note 31).
" Given (a) the asymmetric distribution of information between workers and man-
agement regarding worker abilities and (b) the inability of management to commit credi-
bly to a given wage structure, piece rate contracts never entirely solve the incentive
problem. See Gary J. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy
ch 5 (Cambridge, 1992); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 Bell J Econ 324
(1982).
' Gennosuke Yokoyama, Nihon no kaso shakai [Japanese Lower-Class Society] 179
(Kyobunkan, 1899) (cotton spinning workers).
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ployees regularly skip work.""7 According to the oral histories of
the workers themselves, they even slept on the job.8
2. Market-clearing wages.
Workers shirked in these early factories for the same reason
workers everywhere liked to shirk: they preferred leisure to work
and had no reason not to indulge that preference. Through their
work, they earned the going rate-a wage that cleared the labor
market. But when labor markets clear, workers who quit a job
can easily find another. And if all firms pay the market-clearing
wage, a worker will earn the same wage in her (most textile
workers were women) new job as she earned in the old. Workers
can safely work when they want, rest when they want. In agri-
cultural and handicraft industries, such work habits seldom dis-
rupt. In a modern factory, they wreak havoc.
If the spinning mill owners could have monitored their work-
ers cheaply, they could have mitigated this problem. If their
managers might have noticed and fired them when they shirked,
workers would have shirked less profligately. Yet monitoring is
not free, of course, and hence the problem. The more monitoring
costs, the more cheaply workers can indulge their preference for
leisure over work. If losing their job costs them little (as with
market-clearing wages) and if monitoring is often ineffective (so
they can often shirk unnoticed), rational workers may choose to
shirk as they please.
3. Efficiency wages.
This situation generates the well-known paradox of "efficien-
cy wages": the more monitoring costs, the more likely employers
can lower labor costs by raising wages. 9 If workers shirk be-
cause they can easily earn equivalent wages elsewhere, a firm
can sometimes save money by paying them more. For when it
" Noshomu sho, Shokkojijo [Circumstances of Factory Workers] 235 (1903; reprinted,
Koseikan, 1981) (steel workers).
' Shigemi Yamamoto, Aa nomugi toge: aru seishi kojo aishi [Ah, the Nomugi Pass: A
Tragic History of the Factory Women in the Silk Thread Industry] 180 (Kadogawa shoten,
1977) ("Tragic History").
2" See Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information 166-67 (Basil Blackwell, 1989); Carl
Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device,
74 Am Econ Rev 433 (1984); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Causes and Consequences of the
Dependence of Quality on Price, 25 J Econ Lit 1 (1987); see also Eric Rasmusen, An
Income-Satiation Model of Efficiency Wages, 80 Econ Inquiry 467, 475 (1992) (model
applicable to low-wage workers).
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does so, workers who lose their job lose income. Rather than lose
their well-paying job (a risk they retain if the firm maintains
even moderate levels of monitoring), they may now decide to
reduce their shirking. Even if all equivalent firms pay the same
high wages, workers who lose their job still lose-for wages above
market-clearing levels necessarily generate unemployment. Given
the higher unemployment levels, fired workers now spend longer
finding their next job.
The classic example is Ford. In 1914, Henry Ford paid his
workers $2.34 per day. The wage was the going rate and cleared
the market. Because everyone else paid it as well, jobs were easy
to find. Workers, observers recalled, could quit Ford in the morn-
ing and find another job by noon. As a result, Ford found himself
with an annual turnover rate of 370 percent, and chaos in his
assembly line. To solve this problem, he doubled wages. At $5 a
day, workers now stood in line for a Ford job. At $5 a day, Ford
himself boasted, "I have a thousand men who if I say 'Be at the
northeast corner of the building at four a.m.,' will be there at
four a.m."'
The large Lancashire cotton spinning mills in the 19th centu-
ry similarly paid efficiency wages.4' Because they regularly ex-
perimented with new technology, they regularly found it hard to
monitor their employees. "In the heyday of industrialization,
managerial methods of supervising workers and monitoring how
much they could produce were unsophisticated," explains econom-
ic historian Michael Huberman.42 Even though the larger
Lancashire firms tried to mitigate these problems with piece-rate
wages, they still "had difficulty in linking effort to output and
setting piece rates." Accordingly, they chose not to rely exclusive-
ly on monitoring. Instead, they "paid efficiency wages to reduce
the loss of productivity associated with shirking."43
o Miller, Managerial Dilemmas at 65-71 (cited in note 35).
41 Michael Huberman, Invisible Handshakes in Lancashire: Cotton Spinning in the
First Half of the Nineteenth Century, 46 J Econ Hist 987 (1986); Michael Huberman, How
Did Labor Markets Work in Lancashire? More Evidence on Prices and Quantities in Cotton
Spinning, 1822-1852, 28 Expl Econ Hist 87 (1991); Michael Huberman, Industrial Rela-
tions and the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from M'Connel and Kennedy, 1810-1840, 65
Bus Hist Rev 345 (1991).
42 Huberman, 28 Expl Econ Hist at 88 (cited in note 41).
4 Id.
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4. The Japanese mills.
Turn-of-the-century Japanese cotton spinning firms also paid
efficiency wages. The giant Kanebo firm did so most extravagant-
ly, advertising not just its wages but also the various other ame-
nities as well. Many historians doubt whether it improved em-
ployee welfare as much as it claimed, but in doubting they miss
the point. Kanebo did not adopt its scheme out of charity. In-
stead, the scheme served as a simple profit-maximizing efficiency
wage strategy. Its wage premium was stark. Table 6 details (i)
the mean daily wage paid by all Boren firms, to their female
workers as of the middle of each year, (ii) the comparable figure
for Kanebo, and (iii) the resulting premium attributable to
Kanebo employment. In the late 19th century, Kanebo paid close
to a third more than its competitors. Although Kanebo's wage
dominance faded, it faded only because other firms soon hiked
their wages as well. As Table 7 shows, the larger firms did adopt
efficiency wages before the smaller firms did; but as Table 8
shows, by 1910 the industry as a whole paid textile workers dou-
ble what they could earn on the farm.
The Japanese story does not parallel early-19th century
Lancashire completely. Where only the larger Lancashire firms
paid high wages, by 1915 large and small Japanese firms alike
paid similar rates (Table 7).44 Because large and small firms
used the same technology in Japan, similar wages and hours are
exactly what one would expect. By the turn of the century, al-
most all Japanese mills used standard steam-powered Platt
Brothers machines.45 Whatever monitoring problems large firms
experienced, small firms experienced them too. After large firms
found it advantageous to pay high wages, small firms soon fol-
lowed suit.
Table 6: THE KANEBo WAGE PREMIUM
Boren Kanebo Kanebo
mean mean premium
1898 V14.99 Y19.60 30.8 %
1908 24.89 29.00 16.5
1919 80.51 84.10 4.5
Source: Calculated from data found in Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai, ed, Dai-
Nippon boseki rengo kai geppo [Great Japan Spinning Federation Monthly Newsletter]
(Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai, 1898, 1908, 1919) (1918 data unavailable).
" A point confirmed by separate calculations in Konosuke Odaka, "Niju kozoz" [Dual
Structure] in Takafusa Nakamura and Konosuke Odaka, eds, Niju kozo [Dual Structure]
133, 161 (Iwanami shoten, 1989).
" Tatsuki, Establishment and Development at 37 (cited in note 30); Saxonhouse, 12
Managerial & Dec Econ at 86 (cited in note 31).
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Table 7: MEAN HouRs AND WAGES iN TE SPINNING DIDUSTRY, By FI i SIZE
A. Daily Hours
Quitil0I 1905 191 191 I=2 I=2
First 19.4 22.7 22.9 22.3 19.8 19.7
Second 19.0 21.7 22.3 21.9 19.0 21.1
Third 18.8 23.3 20.6 23.0 20.1 19.6
Fourth 16.9 22.8 22.6 23.1 20.1 19.9
Fifth 18.1 22.4 21.4 22.8 19.5 20.2
B. Daily Waes
Quintile 105 110 191 121 1925
First ¥0.193 ¥0.239 ¥0.298 ¥0.319 ¥1.109 V1.323
Second 0.195 0.224 0.268 0.302 1.073 1.096
Third 0.175 0.217 0.284 0.310 1.201 1.222
Fourth 0.164 0.190 0.246 0.344 1.079 1.225
Fifth 0.153 0.192 0.236 0.305 1.060 1.260
Mandated cuts: 9.9% 0.0 12.4 27.9 31.5 0.0
Notes: The firms are divided into quintiles on the basis of the number of spindles in each
firm. Wages are daily wages for female workers in current yen. The data are for the months of
July for each year except when July was unavailable (when nearest available month was used
instead). Mandated production cuts are taken from Table 3. Hours are number of hours of
operation of factories operated by firm. 1921 is substituted for 1920 because of the unavailability
of 1920 data.
Sources: Calculated from data found in Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai, ed, Dai-Nippon
boseki rengo kai geppo [Great Japan Spinning Federation Monthly Newsletter] (Dai-Nippon boseki
rengo kai, 1900, 1905, 1910, 1915, 1921, 1925).
5. The need to cut labor quantity.
Given their efficiency wage strategy, Japanese spinners had
to take care not to respond to demand shocks by cutting the price
they paid for the labor they hired. Instead, they had to respond
in a way that preserved the wage premium they paid. To do so,
they had to cut the quantity of labor they hired.46 If they instead
cut their wage premium, they increased shirking. In the long
That cutting production would generally lower per-unit production costs is straight-
forward: on a short-term basis, cutting production quantity lowers marginal (and short-
term average variable) production costs because the marginal cost curve cuts average cost
curves from below, and because the short-term average variable cost curve lies below the
average total cost curve. In a long-term equilibrium, of course, firms will sell at a price
equal to long-term total average costs.
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run, they thereby lowered profits. Japanese firms did just what
we would expect-when demand fell, they cut the quantity of
labor they hired (Table 8).
Note a complication: if spinning firms cut output by firing
workers, they potentially vitiated their efficiency wage scheme,
for workers would discount their higher wages by their higher
probability of being fired. Rather than lay off existing workers,
therefore, Japanese spinning firms cut production by delaying
new hires. In most years, 1/4 to 1/3 of their workers quit volun-
tarily anyway. They quit because they had never planned to work
a long time. They had come to the factory to work a few years
and save. Having done exactly as they planned, they returned to
their farm eventually to marry.47 Because so many women quit
each year, the spinning firms could adjust to demand shocks
simply by deferring new hires.4
B. The Evidence of Efficiency Wages
Several aspects of the Japanese cotton spinning industry
suggest (even if they do not prove) that the firms paid efficiency
wages. Consider in this respect the price of labor, the stability of
the wage premium, oral evidence from the women involved, and
the use of performance bonds.
1. The price of labor.
Few facts about the spinning firms are more prominent than
the high wages they paid their workers (Table 8). During much of
the pre-war period, about 80 percent of the cotton spinning work-
ers were women, and about 60 percent of these women came
from the farm.49 For an efficiency wage, the crucial premium for
" But see E. Patricia Tsurumi, Factory Girls: Women in the Thread Mills of Meiji:
Japan 172-73 (Princeton, 1990) (arguing that women returned for other reasons).
" Hosei daigaku keizai gaku bu, ed, Keihin kogyo chitai o chushin to suru chingin
chosa hokoku [Survey Report on Wages Paid Primarily in the Keihin Industrial Area] 187-
91 (Hosei daigaku keizai gaku bu, 1936)("Keihin Industrial Area Wages"); Riyuemon Uno,
Shokko kinzoku nen su cho (jo) [A Survey of Work Tenure Among Factory Workers (I)] 14
(Kogyo kyoiku kai, 1915) (Shokko mondai shiryo, No. A163); Riyuemon Uno, Shokko
kinzoku nen su cho (ge) [A Survey of Work Tenure Among Factory Workers (II)] 12 (Kogyo
kyoiku kai, 1915) (Shokko mondai shiryo, No. A164).
" Chuo shokugyo shokai jimukyoku, ed, Boseki rodo fujin chosa [An Investigation
into Women Working in the Spinning Industry] 5 (Chuo shokugyo shokai jimukyoku, 1929)
("Women in the Spinning Industry"); Takejiro Shindo, Mengyo rodo sanko tokei [Reference
Statistics Regarding Labor in the Cotton Industry] 365 (Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1958)
("Cotton Labor Statistics").
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cotton spinning workers was the premium they received over the
agricultural wage. By 1910, the spinning firms paid these women
double their agricultural wage. They continued to pay at least
double for most of the next three decades.0
Other" data indirectly confirm these high wages. Take one
1927 survey of 3,966 workers at 12 cotton spinning factories.
These women sent home each month mean amounts ranging
from 5.2 percent of their wages at one factory to 60.5 percent at
another. Unfortunately, the report does not give the number of
respondents within each plant. Averaging the 12 factory means,
however, gives a mean of 36.0 percent. In addition, these women
every month saved another 7.0 to 52.1 percent of their pay. Av-
eraging the factory means gives 24.3 percent. All told, the women
saved or sent home an average of 59.9 percent of their wages:
amounts ranging from a mean of 43.2 percent at the lowest facto-
ry to 67.5 percent at the highest.5
o Shindo, Cotton Labor Statistics at 396 (cited in note 49), finds similar ratios for the
early post-War years. I use mean annual wage rates for female agricultural workers
rather than mean daily wage rates (as, for example, Takamura, 1 History of Japanese
Spinning Industry at 302 (cited in note 29), does) for two reasons. First, agricultural work
was highly seasonal where textile work was steadier. Thus, daily textile and agricultural
rates do not give an accurate picture of the relative expected earnings of women in the
two sectors. Second, spinning firms generally provided room (or at least provided heavily
subsidized room) in addition to wages; yearly agricultural contracts probably did as well,
though daily work did not. Note that most spinning firms did charge for board. According
to one 1927 survey of 12 cotton spinning factories, the women paid the factory a mean
food charge ranging from 10.8 percent of salary at one factory to 22.8 percent at another.
The mean of the 12 factory means was 16.9 percent. Chuo, Women in the Spinning Indus-
try at 69-70 (cited in note 49). See also, Hosei, Keihini Industrial Area Wages at 168 (cited
in note 48). According to Riyuemon Uno, Shoku hi teigaku no chosa [A Survey of Food
Charges] (Kogyo kyoiku kai, 1917) (Shokko mondai shiryo, No. B79), factories charged an
average of 9.31 sen/day for board, and subsidized these meals with another 4.57 sen/day.
" Chuo, Women in the Spinning Industry at 69-70 (cited in note 49); Hosei, Keihin
Industrial Area Wages at 140, 184 (cited in note 48) (corroborating data). Firms some-
times offered the woman (or her family) a sign-on loan of part of her future earnings.
Unlike the cash advances in the sex industry, see J. Mark Ramseyer, Indentured Prostitu-
tion in Imperial Japan: Credible Commitments in the Commercial Sex Industry, 7 J L
Econ & Org 89 (1991), these loans were relatively small. Of a sample of 8,926 workers
hired by large Tokyo-area spinning factories in 1926, workers (or their families) received a
mean sign-on loan of only ¥22.23-about 16 days' wages. See Chuo, Women in the Spin-
ning Industry at 33; corroborated by data in Hosei, Keihin Industrial Area Wages at 99,
140. In comparison, the mean sign-on loans in the sex industry in the mid-1920s were
V959 and V1194 for geisha and licensed prostitutes respectively. Ramseyer, 7 J L Econ &
Org at 101-02.
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2. The stable premium.
If the shadow wage for the workers was their wage in agri-
cultural employment, the cotton spinning firms paid them a pre-
mium over that wage that held relatively steady (Table 8). Again,
the point suggests (certainly it does not prove it, for agricultural
and textile wages might well have moved in tandem even absent
efficiency wages) that the firms considered it important to offer
their workers a wage that stayed much higher than the wage
those workers could have earned elsewhere. In general, the ratio
of textile to agricultural wages held fairly constant: textile work-
ers earned double or triple the agricultural wage. The firms paid
these high wages even when they themselves faced dramatic cuts
in demand: even when corporate profits fell, relative employee
wages held firm.
3. Oral accounts.
According to the workers themselves, not only did the firms
pay high wages, they supplied reasonable working conditions.
High wages in themselves would not, of course, prove that the
firms paid efficiency wages. Instead, the firms might have paid
market-clearing wages that compensated for unusually harsh
disamenities. The women themselves, however, generally found
no such disamenities.
Sophisticated social historians continue to argue the con-
trary. Gail Lee Bernstein, for example, describes the lives of silk-
reeling workers (a job with some technical differences from cotton
spinning) as "deplorable." Workers sang, she adds, songs with
titles like "Song of the Living Corpses."52 Patricia Tsurumi de-
scribes the spinning mill dormitories as "prisons," the wash
rooms as "appalling," and the food as "shoddy" and inadequate.
Winter days in the factories were cold, and "the hot humid days
of summer were hell."" Andrew Gordon assigns textile workers
52 Gail Lee Bernstein, Women in the Silk-reeling Industry in Nineteenth-century
Japan, in Gail Lee Bernstein & Haruhiro Fukui, eds, Japan and the World: Essays on
Japanese History and Politics in Honour of Ishida Takeshi 63 (St. Martin's, 1988). She
rightly notes, though, that the women "may have been better off" than they had been at
home. Id at 67. An English translation of the song appears at Tsurumi, Factory Girls 157-
59 (cited in note 47).
Tsurumi, Factory Girls at 132-35, 141 (cited in note 47). Elsewhere, she properly
notes that the wages were higher than other employment opportunities for women, and
that the "poorly prepared and spoiled food" that the women supposedly received "would
have seemed a splendid feast" to starving peasants. Id at 134, 147-48, 162.
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"the worst objective situation of any group of workers." ' And
Mikiso Hane concludes that "what frequently came to prevail was
unrestrained exploitation."
55
At root, the historians rely too heavily on the documents
bourgeois journalists and social reformers left, for the women
themselves told a radically different story." According to them,
not only did they earn high wages, they worked under almost
pleasant conditions. That journalists and social reformers on the
one hand, and the women workers on the other, reacted different-
ly to factory conditions should not surprise us. The journalists
were urban, educated white-collar professionals. The workers
were daughters of poor tenant farmers. That the journalists
would have thought the conditions harsh tells us little about
what tenant farmers would have thought. And that social reform-
ers thought them harsh tells us even less-what else, one might
ask, would one expect a reformer to say?
Consider oral historian Shigemi Yamamoto's experience.
Yamamoto interviewed 580 former textile workers for what he
planned as their "tragic history." To his surprise, none of the
women regretted having taken her factory job, none complained
of the food she ate in the factory dormitories, none thought she
had been underpaid, and only three percent of the women
thought their work had been harsh. By contrast, 90 percent
thought the food had been good, 70 percent thought their pay had
been high, and most found the work "more fun than the work at
' Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan 75 (University of
California, 1991). The fact that some workers sometimes struck for higher pay or better
working conditions is no evidence that pay was low or conditions bad. All else equal, even
college professors prefer higher pay to lower, and better working conditions to worse. As a
result, it would be curious if workers did not sometimes strike. Even in the modern U.S.,
the workers who strike are not disproportionately concentrated in the lowest paying or
most unpleasant jobs.
' Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey 144 (Westview Press, 1986). See
also, Barbara Molony, Activism Among Women in the Taisho Cotton Textile Industry in
Gall Lee Bernstein, ed, Recreating Japanese Women, 1600-1945 217, 232 (California, 1991)
("Girls' salaries were extremely low."). However, Hane rightly notes that the women were
pleased with their food. Mikiso Hane, Peasant, Rebels, & Outcastes: The Underside of
Modern Japan 181 (Pantheon, 1982).
' A mistake scholars of Japanese history have made elsewhere as well, both when
they write about women specifically, see Ramseyer, 7 J L Econ & Org at 92-93 (cited in
note 51), and when they write about peasants generally, see Richard J. Smethurst,
Agricultural Development and Tenancy Disputes in Japan, 1870-1940 21-22 (Princeton,
1986). A few historians cite diary evidence. But, even diaries are problematic given that
the best-educated women (the workers with the best paying and most comfortable alterna-
tive jobs) would disproportionately have kept diaries.
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home."57
"At least I got to eat rice," one former textile worker told
Yamamoto. "It was better than staying home." The boys-who
did stay home-had the reciprocal reaction.
Just once, you should come see a farming or fishing village.
You won't find a single girl. All you'll see are shrivelled old
grannies. The girls are all gone, left the village for work....
We guys are left, but we're lonely. Real lonely. Even suppose
I can take the loneliness. How am I going to find a wife? I
want a wife so bad I'm going crazy. But no girl'll marry a
poor farmer anymore. Even when they come back to the
village from the factories, they've turned completely high-
class. With their hair done up and perfumed and all, they
won't even look at us.
It was a letter to the editor of a Tokyo daily newspaper, and it
captured at least some of the economic impact of the textile in-
dustry.58 Having made a minor fortune in the mills, the women
had raised their sights. It is not what one reads in the tirades
against the mills so popular in the fashionable histories. But the
fashionable histories miss the industry's effect on female in-
comes. If some women sang Bernstein's "Song of the Living
Corpses," others sang some very different songs-songs that echo
more the notion that time flies when you're having fun:59
Shall I fall in love with the boss,
or shall I ignore the boss?
Think about it,
and before you know it you've finished the thread.
Rather than fall for the boss and be hated,
I think I'll head for the sunshine,
I think I'll head for the young ones.
I may have left home saying I'd reel thread,
but now I'm reeling in guys instead.
"It was harder work at first than I had done before," recalled
one old woman. As a young girl, she had left her hometown for a
Yamamoto, Tragic History at 332 (cited in note 38).
Quoted in Yamamoto, Tragic History at 121 (cited in note 38). Of course, there may
have been other reasons factory women would not give this man the time of day-there
usually are. Of the 1,536 women in spinning factories surveyed in 1927, 801 said they
hoped to marry a farmer. See Chuo, Women in the Spinning Industry at 22-23 (cited in
note 49).
" Yamamoto, Tragic History at 50, 72 (cited in note 38).
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silk-reeling factory. "But since there were lots of us and we all
worked together, it was kind of fun. And besides, it paid bet-
ter."0 Had the workers earned market-clearing wages for harsh
work, one suspects few would have remembered their factory
years with the affection that Yamamoto found.
4. Performance bonds.
The textile firms offered labor contracts that in other ways
corroborated how hard they tried to create incentives for their
employees not to shirk. Most dramatically, many firms withheld
part of their workers' wages as performance bonds. As it had
been for many indentured servants in the Americas,6' part of a
textile worker's pay was contingent on her satisfactorily complet-
ing her contract.62 If she shirked or quit, the firm kept the bond;
if she worked well and completed her contract, it paid her the
bond when she quit. As one might expect, workers hated these
contractual provisions.' Only firms that found it unusually
hard to monitor their workers would have demanded contracts
that placed their workers in as disadvantageous a position as did
these.
Table 8: TnE PRICE AND QUANTrry OF LABOR IN COTTON SPINNING
A. B. C. D.
Daily Hourly Spin/ Quantity(current V) (constant sen) agri. (person-days)
1890 .08 2.22 27z62
1892 .09 2.71 1.37 4,984
1894 .10 2.95 1.43 7,842
1896 .12 2.85 1.47 9,405
1898 .16 3.27 1.17 15,413
1900 .19 3.96 1.61 15,236
1902 .22 4.10 1.71 16,933
1904 .22 4.07 1.75 13,952
1906 .25 4.02 1.84 20,153
1908 .27 4.13 1.90 17,999
1910 .29 4.68 2.14 23,263
1912 .32 4.38 1.65 25,200
1914 .33 4.79 2.21 29,271
1916 .33 4.74 2.08 32,616
1918 .47 4.10 1.57 29,415
1920 1.31 8.95 2.74 34,103
Quoted in Yamamoto, Tragic History at 336 (cited in note 38).
61 Stanley L. Engerman, Servants to Slaves to Servants: Contract Labour and Europe-
an Expansion, in P.C. Emmer, ed, Colonialism and Migration; Indentured Labour Before
and After Slavery 263, 268-69 (M. Nijhoff, 1986).
' See Chuo, Women in the Spinning Industry at 67-68 (cited in note 49); Nobuhiko
Murakami, MeUi josei shi [A History of Meiji Women] 135 (Riron sha, 1971).
' See Noshomu sho, ed, Menshi boseki shokkojijo [Conditions of Factory Workers in
Cotton Spinning] 99 (Noshomu sho, 1903).
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1922 1.30 9.49 2.38 41,885
1924 1.29 10.26 2.38 35,627
1926 1.30 10.70 2.38 45,118
1928 1.35 11.76 2.83 38,720
1930 1.16 13.97 2.56 33,710
1932 .85 11.16 2.79 33,197
1934 .77 9.62 2.43 38,830
1936 .73 8.76 2.01 40,158
Notes:
(A) Mean daily wage in yen for female workers in cotton spinning sector, current prices.(B) Mean hourly wage in sen (Y11100) for female workers in cotton spinning sector, constant 1934-36
prices.
(C) Mean annual wage for female workers in cotton spinning sector, divided by mean annual wage
for female workers in agricultural industry.(D) 1000 person-days worked by female laborers in spinning sector.
Sources: Calculated on the basis of data from Shozaburo Fujino, Shino Fujino and Akira Ono,
Choki keizai tokei: Sen'i kogyo [Long-Term Economic Statistics: The Textile Industry] 27, 256-77 (Toyo
keizai shimpo sha, 1979); Takahiko Hashimoto, Nip pon menshiseki gyo shi nempo [A Time Line for the
Japanese Cotton Yarn Spinning Industry] (Bunka shi nempyo seisaku kenkyu kai, 1935); Noshomu sho
somukyoku tokeika, ed, Noshomu tokei hyo [Agricultural and Commercial Statistics] (Noshomu sho
somukyoku tokeika, years listed in table); Kazushi Ohkawa, et al Choki keizai tokei: Bukka [Long-Term
Economic Statistics: Prices] 134-36 (Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1967); Takejiro Shindo, Mengyo rodo sanko
tokei [Reference Statistics Regarding Labor in the Cotton Industry] 500-03 (Tokyo daigaku shuppan kni,
1958); Matsuji Umemura, et al, Choki keizai tokei: Norin gyo [Long-term Economic Statistics: Agricul-
ture and Forestry] 220-21 (Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1966).
C. Cartels as a Corporate Governance Mechanism
Return, then, to the basic question: if the Boren firms could
not earn monopoly rents, why did they coordinate production
cuts? The answer, I suggest, derives from the principal-agent
slack in corporate governance: absent a cartel, managers would
have found it difficult credibly to commit to keeping the firm's
efficiency wage regime. In turn, that difficulty derived from four
constraints on the contractual structure of the pre-war cotton
spinning firms:
1. The firm's managers often needed to raise funds from a
broad range of investors.
2. The firm needed to respond to demand shocks by cutting
production, and by not cutting its efficiency wage premium.
3. Investors could obtain only noisy information (a) about
the wages that their managers paid laborers, and (b) about
the demand curve that the industry faced.
4. Managers hesitated to run the plant at less than full
capacity.
Japanese Cotton Spinning Cartels
Take each of these constraints in turn.
1. Dispersed ownership.
Because cotton spinning firms faced significant economies of
scale,' many could raise the large amounts of capital they need-
ed only by issuing stock to a wide spectrum of investors. Togeth-
er, these firms accounted for a major part of the trades on the
Tokyo and the Osaka stock exchanges.65 Had they been able to
attract money from the large conglomerates (the zaibatsu), per-
haps they could have avoided widely dispersed stock holdings.
Whatever the reason, however, those conglomerates chose not to
invest heavily in cotton spinning (Table 10). The firms thus often
had little choice but to build publicly held firms.
2. Demand shock responses.
For reasons explained above,66 spinning firms needed to en-
sure that the managers did not respond to demand shocks by
cutting the firm's efficiency wage premium. Necessarily, this
meant they had to reduce production.
3. Noisy information.
a) Wages. Public investors in the spinning firms had
only noisy information about their firm's wage scales. Had the
firm paid its workers a straight daily wage, a straight seniority
based wage, or a straight piece-rate contract, the investors would
have had clean information. Their managers could have reported
the scale they paid, and they could then have hired an
independent auditor to verify the report.
Most cotton spinning firms, however, blended seniority wag-
es with piece-rate wages. 7 Pure fixed or seniority-based con-
tracts created incentive problems: workers had less reason to
Seld, Japanese Cotton Industry Theory at 204, 473 (cited in note 4).
See generally Osaka kabushiki torihiki sho, ed, Okabu 50.nenshi [50-Year History
of the OSE] (Osaka kabushiki torihiki sho, 1928) ("50-Year History"); Tokyo kabushiki
torihild sho, ed, Tokyo kabushiki torihiki sho [The Tokyo Stock Exchange] (Keizai shimbun
sha, 1916) ("Tokyo Stock Exchange").
6 See text accompanying note 46.
' Riyuemon Uno, Shokko chingin shiharai no shin hoho [A New Means of Paying
Factory Workers] (Kogyo kyoiku kai, 1913); Hosei, Keihin Industrial Area Wages at 160-89
(cited in note 48). Tsurumi, Factory Girls at 148 (cited in note 47), claims that firms
generally used pure piece-rate contracts for women, but this claim is belied by her own
account of the many discretionary adjustments made.
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work hard, and more reason to shirk. Pure piece-rate contracts
created metering and quality problems: (i) cotton spinning in-
volved too much team production to permit a manager to meter
individual output cleanly and readily, and (ii) piece-rate contracts
induced workers to lower the quality of the output they produced.
To mitigate these problems, most cotton spinning firms blended
the two contractual forms: they paid a worker by her team's
output, but on an individualized per-unit scale that depended on
how the manager generally appraised the pace and quality of her
work. As a result, a manager rated each worker's skill and dili-
gence. He gauged the quality and quantity of her output, and ad-
justed his estimate from time to time as warranted. In turn, she
could increase her pay both by inducing her team to increase its
production (thereby increasing her own units of output), and by
impressing her supervisor (thereby increasing her per-unit wage).
Investors received only noisy information about all this for
two reasons: the factory hired new workers regularly, and the
investors could not readily gauge whether a manager promoted
his workers on the per-unit scale at the optimal pace. To create
the right incentives for their workers, the investors had to dele-
gate discretion to their manager. In the process, they necessarily
left themselves vulnerable. If a manager wanted to cheat on the
firm's efficiency wages, he could promote his workers too slowly;
if he wanted to waste firm resources, he could promote them too
generously. Should he promote workers either too quickly or too
slowly, investors would learn that fact only much later, if at all.
Eventually, they might discover that they were paying higher
wages than they needed to pay, or that they were incurring high-
er monitoring costs because their spartan wages had raised em-
ployee shirking. Alternatively, though, they might never know.
Firms fail for a myriad of reasons, and many investors never
learn why; ex post, investors often have trouble disentangling
why a firm did so poorly. The managers responsible may have
long since left anyway.
b) Demand curve. While investors lacked clean
information about their own wage scales, they also lacked clean
information about the industry's demand curve. Granted, they
knew their own firm's sales. Yet, with only that information they
could not distinguish between (i) a fall in industry-wide demand
and (ii) a fall in demand specific to their firm. These two
problems, however, dictated radically different responses: the
former dictated production cuts, while the latter required a
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product change to meet consumer tastes. Absent industry-wide
information, investors could not distinguish the two."
4. Managerial reluctance to cut production.
Even where investors would have wanted their manager to
cut production, a manager sometimes had an incentive not to do
so. To see why, suppose first that he had short-term horizons.
Many probably did, for the shortage of well-trained managers
enabled people who wanted to switch jobs to do so easily. For
them, pre-war Japan was not the Japan of "lifetime employ-
ment." Suppose too that a manager discovered that industry-wide
demand had fallen. If he either operated the plant at a loss or
idled part of it, investors would notice. If he kept the plant at full
capacity and kept it in the black by cutting wages, investors
would not notice-at least for some time. To cut the short-term
wage bill, he needed only to slow the rate at which he promoted
his workers. In the long run, by lowering the efficiency wage
premium the firm paid, he would increase shirking and raise the
firm's wage bill. In the short run, he could avoid an investigation
of his managerial activities-and the short run can often last a
long time.
The manager's incentive to cut wages and operate the plant
at full capacity stemmed from the noisy information and collec-
tive action problems the firm's investors faced. Assume-counter-
factually-that a single investor with perfect information owned
each cotton spinning firm. If industry-wide demand fell, the in-
vestor could order his manager to cut capacity. If the manager
instead cut wages, he could fire him. Now assume-more realisti-
cally-that investors had noisy and incomplete information, and
that each owned only a small share of the firm. Two problems
would ensue. First, because of their coarse information sets,
investors could not distinguish industry-wide slumps from firm-
specific declines. Second, because of their collective-action prob-
lems, investors had little incentive to intervene in their firm
unless they received strong signals that their managers might
have misbehaved.69
Price information on yarns would not yield this information because of the broad
fluctuations in prices during these years. See Kazushi Ohkawa, et al, Choki keizai tokei:
Bukka [Long-Term Economic Statistics: Prices] 134-36 (Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1967).
' True, because the stock was listed on the national exchanges, they could easily sell
their interests even if they received only weak signals that their managers had misbe-
haved. Given that their sale price would have incorporated those signals, though, they
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To protect his tenure at a firm, a manager had somehow to
insure that investors received no strong signals that he may have
mismanaged it. If he either ran the plant in the red or idled part
of it, he sent just such a signal. He then ran the risk that inves-
tors would find it cost-effective to intervene and investigate. If
the manager had idled the plant, he might have done so either
(a) because of an industry-wide slump, or (b) because of his own
poor performance. If he could be sure investors would obtain
perfect information, then he would not worry whether he had
done a good job. The investors would absolve him and leave. If
investors could obtain only noisy and incomplete information,
however, then even an honest and able manager faced a
nontrivial risk of discharge or demotion. In such a world, a man-
ager often did better by sending no signals that investors might
interpret unfavorably.
5. The solution.
Firms in the Japanese cotton spinning industry solved these
problems through the Boren. They did so in two steps. First, they
pooled information about industry-wide demand. By contributing
information about their own firms, they together generated the
data that let them gauge the extent they suffered from industry-
wide demand shocks. They could then forward that information
to their investors, and-if their investors faced no collective-ac-
tion problems-those investors could determine whether the firm
should cut capacity. Absent collective-action problems, the firms
needed the Boren for information pooling and for nothing more.
Yet the investors in many cotton spinning firms did face
collective action problems, and it was to mitigate those problems
that the Boren not only pooled information but also ordered ca-
pacity cuts. Just as privately held firms could trust their owner
to decide whether to cut production, publicly traded firms could
replicate that result by delegating the decision about production
cuts to a third party, the Boren. In giving Boren officers the au-
thority over production cuts during demand shocks, managers
committed themselves credibly to reducing output during slack
times. In the process, they lowered their firm's marginal costs,
increased the odds that the firm would stay in the black, and
thereby mitigated their own incentive to cut the firm's wage
scale.7° In the process, they helped commit themselves to the
would have found the sale small consolation.
70 Obviously, managers still had an incentive to cut wages in order to keep the firm
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firm's efficiency wage strategy, and reduced their investors' cost
of verifying that they adhered to that strategy. In effect, manag-
ers and owners assigned to the Boren the task not just of pooling
information, but of interpreting it, of enforcing that interpreta-
tion, and of (indirectly) protecting wage levels.71
The Boren membership patterns loosely corroborate this
hypothesis. During the early decades of the century, not all cot-
ton spinning firms joined the Boren. However, nearly all firms
that listed their shares on either the Tokyo or Osaka stock ex-
change did. All such firms faced the principal-agent and collec-
tive-action problems described above, and most mitigated them
through the Boren. Only privately held firms faced less of a prob-
lem, and primarily only they avoided the Boren. 2
Note that this hypothesis for the Boren's cartel solves two
puzzles posed earlier. First, it explains why the firms formed this
cartel despite the prisoners' dilemma that cartels are said to face.
Cartels face a prisoners' dilemma only if the firms hope to earn
monopoly rents. If-as here-they are not trying to earn such
rents, they face no dilemma. In the case of the Boren, the firms
joined the cartel to solve an internal monitoring problem. As a
result, they found it profitable to obey the cartel's mandate re-
gardless of what other firms did.
Second, this hypothesis explains why the Boren did not need
to limit investments in new capacity during the times it mandat-
ed production cuts. Recall that the Boren often required firms to
in the black if the firm was losing money for other reasons. The Boren did not solve the
problem of credible commitments for all purposes-it mitigated it for one of the most com-
mon situations in which managers would have had an incentive to cheat on the efficiency
wage.
"' Note that this was a low-risk strategy. In a world without antitrust laws, firms did
not incur legal risks in fixing quantities. Moreover, in an internationally competitive
industry with many spinners from many countries, the firms did not incur many techno-
logical risks by sharing information. See Saxonhouse, 12 Managerial & Dec Econ at 2
(cited in note 31).
' Of the 11 non-Boren cotton spinning firms listed in Zaisei, Japanese Textile In-
dustry Overview at 210 (cited in note 24), none had listed stock. Although Nippon kangyo,
Cotton Threat at 58 (cited in note 8), lists two muslin firms outside the Boren and both
had publicly traded stock, Shigeru Kano, ed, Tokyo kabushiki torihikijo [Tokyo Stock Ex-
change] 125 (Hideshi Kano, 1933), lists these firms as not being cotton spinning firms. It
is difficult to differentiate cotton spinning firms on the basis of name alone. If we elimi-
nate firms that seem to have specialized in flax and wool, however, as of 1925 the only
non-Boren cotton spinning firm on either the Tokyo Stock Exchange or the Osaka Stock
Exchange was one Naniwa boshoku. On Boren membership, see Dai-Nippon, Great Japan
Spinning (cited in note 19). On the stock listings, see Osaka, 50-Year History (cited in
note 65); Tokyo, Tokyo Stock Exchange (cited in note 65); Kano, Tokyo Stock Exchange
(cited in this note).
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idle specified percentages of their capacity, but never banned
them from augmenting that capacity (Table 2). If Boren members
hoped to raise prices, this made no sense. Without a way to limit
new capacity, they could not have cut production and could not
have raised prices. By contrast, suppose that the Boren firms
negotiated their agreement only to mitigate the agency slack
between investors and their managers. The firms now did not
need to use the Boren to ban investments in new capacity be-
cause most of them had already removed that decision from the
prerogative of the managers and assigned it to the investors
directly. They did so by regularly draining the firm of cash.73
Through high dividend policies, they insured that they often
could build new plants only by raising new capital-only by sub-
jecting their new project to the discipline of the capital market."4
The Boren's cartel was a way for managers better to align their
incentives with those of their shareholders on those matters en-
trusted to the managers; decisions about new investments were
decisions that the shareholders never entrusted to the managers.
6. Limitations.
I began this article by suggesting this analysis
might--potentially-explain a variety of cartels anywhere. As
noted above, however, this analysis depends on several assump-
tions that do limit its applicability. In the interests of full disclo-
sure, I repeat those assumptions here. First and most obviously,
this hypothesis explains cartels only where firms find it profit-
able to pay efficiency wages. If they prefer to pay market-clearing
wages, this analysis will not apply.
Second, the more closely shareholders can monitor managers,
the less likely this hypothesis applies. In this paper, I assume
that shareholders could not readily monitor what their managers
did. They could not easily verify the wages managers paid work-
ers. They could not even intervene in corporate affairs routinely.
Instead, they often saw the results of mismanagement only after
it had taken its toll on the firm, and they intervened in the firm
only when their manager sent relatively strong signals that he
might have mismanaged. For turn-of-the-century Japan, these
" For evidence of high dividend rates in the spinning industry, see Dai-Nippon
boseki rengo kai, Menshi boseki jijo sanko sho [Reference Regarding Cotton Yarn Spinning
Matters] (Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai, various years).
" See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 Am
Econ Rev 650, 654 (1984).
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are not unreasonable assumptions: economic historians regularly
remind us that managing a large factory requires institutions
and technologies we have only recently acquired.75 For modern
industries, however, these institutional and technological con-
straints may bind less.
Third, the more often firms in the industry face different cost
curves, the less likely this hypothesis applies. Firms will find it
advantageous to assign to a third party the right to order uni-
form reductions in the machines they operate only if they face
relatively similar costs. The greater the dispersion in those costs,
the less likely they will find such an arrangement advantageous.
Table 9: ScALE EcoNomus IN CoTtoN SPINNING
A. Relative Costs:
Spindles/ Wages Amenities Operating
labor) costs Total
5,000 21.77 104.14 16.92 22.37 165.20
10,000 21.77 73.59 11.95 19.34 126.65
20,000 21.77 57.66 9.35 18.84 107.64
30,000 21.77 51.53 8.37 18.33 100.00
40,000 21.77 49.25 8.00 18.09 97.11
50,000 21.77 47.97 7.79 17.93 95.46
60,000 21.77 47.14 7.66 17.83 94.40
B. Firm Size:
Number of No. of Total
inde Firms (M Sindles 1(%)
Uder10,000 10 (12.5) 51,268 (0.4)
10,000- 49,999 25 (31.3) 614,820 (5.0)
50,000- 99,999 14 (17.5) 932,828 (7.5)
100,000-299,999 20 (25.0) 3,040,996 (24.6)
300,000499,999 3 (3.7) 1,050,604 (8.5)
500,000 and over 8 (10.0) 6,668,248 (54.0)
Note: In A, costs are indexed by expenses for 30,000-spindle factories, and are for No. 20
yarn. In B, firm size is as of 1937.
Source: Keizo Seki, Nihon mengyo ron [A Theory of the Japanese Cotton Industry] 204, 473
(Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1954).
Table 10: ZAIBTSU IvEnSwINTs IN Co rON SPImNIN
A. Zaibatsu Holdings in Spinning Firms
The Mitsui Zaibatsu
Mitsui Firm Mitsui share
Textile firm shareholding ofsindles
Kanebo 6.71% 615,192 41,279
Kinka boseki 41.36 144,624 59,816
Toyoda boshoku 5.97 79,824 4,765
Tenma boshoku 48.58 65,792 31,962
Utsumi boshoku 48.97 72,500 35,503
Tokyo mosurin 48.52 79,128 38,393
Kikui boshoku 1.43 62,428 768
71 See generally, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolu-
tion in American Business (Belknap, 1977); Peter Temin, ed, Inside the Business Enter-
prise: Historical Perspectives on the Use of Information (Chicago, 1991).
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Table 10 (cont'd):
The Mitsubishi Zaibatsu
Firm
Mitsubishi s/g sindls Mitsubishi shae
Nagasaki boshoku 2.79 98,656 2,753
Fuji gasu boseki 1.43 502,104 7,180
The Sumitomo Zaibatsu
Firm
Sumitomo s indles Sumitomo share
Osaka godo boseki 0.67 427,524 2,864
The Yasuda Zaibatsu
Firm
Yadas Yasuda share
Osaka godo boseki 0.86 427,524 3,677
B. Zaibatsu Share of Total Industry Spindles (6.529.394)
SindlesPercen
Mitsui 212,486 3.25
Mitsubishi 9,933 0.15
Sumitomo 2,864 0.04
Yasuda &MU0.06
TOTAL 228,960 3.50
Notes: Figures are from Takahashi (cited below) where available, and from stockholder
lists in company semi-annual reports where not. Mitsui ownership in Kinka and Tokyo mosurin
are Takahashi's estimates. Stock classes are combined on an equal basis. Figures are as of
approximately 1928.
Sources: Kamekichi Takahashi, Nippon zaibatsu no kaibo [An Analysis of the Japanese
ZaibatsuJ (Chuo koron sha, 1930); (Kikui boshoku, Semi-annual Company Reports (1928);
Tenma boshoku, Semi-annual Company Reports (1928); and Osaka bodo, Semi-annual Company
Reports (1928)).
CONCLUSION
Peasants may be poor, Donald McCloskey reminds us, but
they are not fools. 76 They respond to market incentives, and
they respond rationally. To induce them to work in the new cot-
ton spinning factories, the owners had to make it worth their
while; to induce them to work hard in the new mills, they had to
make it lucrative. The owners did so by paying peasant women
double or triple their market-clearing wage. Largely, their
scheme worked. Rather than lose such a well-paying job, the
young women worked hard.
Within the firm, that which promoted the welfare of its man-
agers did not always promote the welfare of its investors. In par-
ticular, given the noisy information and the diversified ownership
" Donald N. McCloskey, The Prudent Peasant: New Findings in Open Fields, 51 J
Econ Hist 343 (1991).
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patterns in the industry, managers sometimes had an incentive
to respond to demand shocks suboptimally-to cheat on the firm's
high wage strategy rather than to cut plant capacity. To commit
credibly to cutting capacity rather than wages, the managers
placed the firm in the Boren. By joining a production-limitation
cartel, they tied their hands-they assigned the decision about
wage and production cuts to a third party, and removed their
own incentive to lower the wage premium the firm paid to its
workers during slack demand.
Although the Boren adopted the appearance of a cartel, it
accomplished something radically different. The spinning firms
used a cartel to coordinate production cutbacks, but they did not
use it to earn monopoly rents. Instead, they used it to lower
operating costs. Whether in Japan or elsewhere, scholars too
readily conclude that if it looks like a monopoly rent and quacks
like a monopoly rent, it must be a monopoly rent. Like ducks,
like rents: the Japanese spinning firms illustrate again how
wrong that approach can be.
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